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Definisi orang dan bukan orang selalu mengalami perubahan dalam 
sepanjang sejarah hukum. Zaman dulu orang tidak mengakui budak 
sebagai person. Baru-baru ini budak diterima sebagai subjek hukum 
secara sah menurut hukum. Artikel ini membahas persyaratan  orang 
dihadapan hukum berdasarkan tujuan khusus, dan kemudian 
membahas makna dari manusia sebagai subjek hukum dalam hukum 
pidana. Untuk melakukan pembahasan tersebut, metode yang 
digunakan dalam kajian ini adalah penelitian doktrinal  digabungkan 
dengan pendekatan filosofis. Beberapa teori mengenai orang sebagai 
subjek hukum dianalisis dan konsen orang dihubungkan dengan 
definisi tentang subjek hukum yang terima akhir-akhir ini dalam 
rancangan KUHP Indonesia. Dari kajian yang sudah dilakukan dapat 
dikemukakan bahwa orang dalam hukum pidana  berkaitan dengan 
norma yang menjadi tujuan dari hukum, seperti pelaku perbuatan  atau 
yang melalaikan perbuatan dan tidak hanya sebagai pemegang hak.  
Subjek hukum tersebut harus seseorang atau sesuatu  dengan 
kemampuan untuk berfikir secara rasional dan kemampuan untuk 
bertanggung jawab atas pilihannya. Rancangan KUHP  mengakui 
orang dan korporasi sebagai subjek hukum. Akibatnya, hal itu 
memasukkan tidak hanya badan sebagai subjek hukum melainkan juga 
kumpulan tanpa  person hukum. Lagi pula termasuk korporasi, segala 
bentuk perkumpulan  seperti negara, lembaga negara, partai 
politik,perusahaan negara, sehingga dapat dipidana. 
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When we talk about person in criminal law, 
traditionally we will only talk about human or 
natural person. And as for the common use of 
the word ‘person’, we will never really think 
about something else besides human being as 
part of homo sapiens species. In criminal law, 
essentially questioned individual 
responsibilities that connect action and guilty 
mind. However, now criminal law recognizes 
person that is not only human but also other 
type of person. Therefore, criminal law 
nowadays, recognizes real persons, fictitious 
persons, artificial person, moral persons, juristic 
persons, legal persons, corporations or no 
person at all.  
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Indonesia in its drafted penal code states that 
persons are natural person including 
corporations. Who are these other persons that 
are recognized by criminal law as persons and 
non-persons? What are sufficient conditions of 
being person in the eye of law according to its 
particular purposes? What exactly is 
corporation? What entities may fall into the 
meaning of corporation? How do other 
countries apply the concept of corporation as 
responsible subject in criminal law?  
This paper attempts to answer those questions. 
It will examine the meaning of legal person and 
moral person in criminal law particularly from 
philosophical perspective. Whether we will just 
have to think in legal formal meaning and 
separate the meaning of legal person and moral 
person, or is there another theory that can 
explain the legal personality of an entity to be 
responsible criminally. Matambanadzo asserts 
that there are various ways to determine who 
counts and how we take account of the meaning 
of person. Citizenship, legal rights, and legal 
subjectivity, are some ways to speak about who 
counts in law and how we take account of them; 
another way is accomplished through the 
concept of legal personhood.1 Which way is the 
most appropriate to be adopted to explain the 
legal status of legal person in criminal law. There 
is something that concerned some legal theorists 
regarding consequences of the different 
approach in accepting the meaning of legal and 
moral person, just like there is debate about 
differences between immoral conducts, illegal 
                                                                
1  Saru M. Matambanadzo, ‘Embodying 
Vulnerability: A Feminist Theory Of The Person’ 
(2012) 20 Duke Journal Of Gender Law & Policy 
45 at 46. 
2  Brendan (Bo) F. Pons, ‘The Law and Philosophy of 
Personhood: Where Should South Dakota 
Abortion Law Go From Here?’ (2013) South 
Dakota Law Review at 121. 
3  Ngaire Naffine, Legal Theory Today, Law’s Meaning 
of Life: Philosophy, Religion, Darwin and the Legal 
Person (Hart Publishing 2009) at 48. 
4  The relation between object and subject is a legal 
relation between persons and those that are 
considered as things; person and thing relations. 
If a thing is defined as under the exclusive power 
behaviours and real crimes, which require evil 
mind and mental element of the offenders.  
In order to discover the appropriate meaning of 
corporation, this paper will explore the legal 
history of the concept, analyse on how experts 
define it, and other countries adopt corporation 




2.2.1 Subject and Object in Law 
In the language of law, there is distinction in 
addressing object and subject. The discussion 
about subject and object is a vital topic in almost 
all legal theories. Because the concept of 
personhood not only affects human interactions, 
but also determined the rights, obligations, and 
legal protections given to a subject or object.2  
Differences about the concept were first 
noticeably elaborated on Roman Law 
Codification.3 
Object would generally be thought as property, 
such as house, land, money, pet, car, and so 
forth.4 Objects can be owned, traded, 
transferred, and transposed. If a person owns an 
object, then the owner will have full control of 
the object, and others must respect its 
ownership.5 The law provides assurance to the 
owner of a property to be able to utilize it, to take 
advantage of it, and to ensure that others will not 
get benefit of it without permission from the 
owner.6  
of a person, with this property-owner 
relationship, other person is forbidden from 
accessing this property and is obligated to respect 
this proprietary powers. See Hans Kelsen, The 
Pure Theory of Law, Its Method and Fundamental 
Concepts, translated with an introduction by 
Charles H. Wilson (1934) 50 The Law Quarterly 
Review at 494. 
5  Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, 6th 
printing, translated by Anders Wedberg, (The 
Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 2003) at 494. 
6  Stephen R. Munzer, ‘Theory of Property’, in 
Martin P. Golding and William A. Edmundson 
(eds), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Law and 
Legal Theory (Blackwell Publishing, 2005) at 198. 
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On the other hand, subject is something that can 
signify anything that has certain consequences.7 
In the field of law, the consequences that are 
signified by the subject are social consequences 
in character; these consequences are controlled 
and modified because they hold rights and 
obligations, privileges and immunities.8 With 
this meaning, can be understood that inanimate 
objects such as molecules or tables or trees are 
not qualified to be the subject of law, because 
they may have certain social consequences for 
their surroundings, but those social 
consequences do not appear because they carry 
rights and obligations. Inanimate objects will 
continue to behave exactly as they behave with 
or without the rights and obligations that existed 
at those. In contrast, human, singular person or 
group of people, obviously going to act 
differently, or may bring different 
consequences, depending on certain rights and 
obligations they possess, and according to 
certain rights and obligations given to them.9 
Legal subjects are usually referred to as persons. 
Historically, person meant mask commonly 
worn by Greek and Roman actors on the stage of 
a show.10 Person then meant actors who wore 
                                                                
7   The concept of subject does not only apply in legal 
science but prevails in all sciences. It developed 
initially in mathematics and physics. The word 
‘subject’ has been used in legal theory as a 
descriptive term, meaning a right and duty-
bearing unit. But actually word ‘subject’ has not 
been widely used in legal discussion. It has been 
considered important particularly in German 
theory, which has applied first to describe what 
makes anything appropriately a subject, as a 
qualification of having right and duties, and in 
German theory of “subjectivity” is itself discussed 
in depth particularly in Kant writings. John 
Dewey, ‘The Historic Background of Corporate 
Legal Personality’ (1926) 35 The Yale Law Journal 
655 at 659-661. 
8  Ibid. 
9  Ibid. 
10  PW Duff, Personality in Roman Private Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 1938) at 3. 
11  John Austin, in R. Campbell (ed), 5th edition, 
Lectures on Jurisprudence (John Murray, 1885) at 
164. 
12  Mochtar Kusumaatmdja dan Arief Sidharta, 
Pengantar Ilmu Hukum: Suatu Pengenalan Ruang 
Lingkup Berlakunya Ilmu Hukum (Introduction to 
that mask with the characters and roles attached 
to it. The term person ultimately used as legal 
terminology, which means something that can 
bear legal rights and legal duties. These legal 
rights and duties are differentiated by certain 
circumstances, similar to actors on the show 
with its different characters and roles.11 Almost 
all legal literatures, both Indonesian and western 
literatures, define legal subject (subjectum juris, 
rechtpersoonlikheid, or person), as the bearer of 
legal rights and/or duties.12 A legal subject is a 
right holder and at the same time is also an 
obligation holder.13 A subjective right shall not 
exist without a parallel obligation relates to it. 
Thus, a right exist only if there are others who 
have duty corresponds to that right. For this 
reason, state passes legal provisions to ensure 
that the natural rights of each individual are 
protected, by formulating parallel obligations 
with those rights.14  
Where are these rights and duties come from? 
Some theories say that these rights and duties 
are natural law that vested in person from its 
birth.15 It is automatic rights that attach to a 
person, some example of these rights can be 
found on The Universal Declaration of Human 
Legal Studies: A Preliminary to Applicable Sphere of 
Legal Science), Book I, 3rd printing, (PT. Alumni, 
2013) at 80; Soebijono Tjitrowinoto, Hukum di 
Indonesia (Law in Indonesia), (Rahma Kongsi, 1953) 
at 17; Riduan Syahrani, Seluk-Beluk dan Asas-Asas 
Hukum Perdata (Subtlety and Principles of Private 
Law), 3rd edition, (PT. Alumni, 2006) at 41. Bryant 
Smith, ‘Legal Personality’ (1928) 37 Yale Law 
Journal 283 at 283: ‘a person is a capable of rights 
and duties,’ Maitland also states that person is ‘a 
right and duty bearing unit,’ see Frederic William 
Maitland, in H.A.L. Fisher (editor), The Collective 
Papers of Frederic William Maitland (The University 
Press, 1911), Michoud asserts that ‘for legal 
science, the notion of person... signifies simply a 
subject of rights –duties,’ cited from John Dewey, 
supra note 9 at 659. 
13  Kelsen, Pure Theory.., supra note 6 at 116. 
14  Ibid at 118-119. 
15  The theory of natural law can be traced back to the 
Greek logic, the theory of Plato, Aristotle and their 
followers, where each theory had varied widely 
through history. And according to this theory, 
obligation or duty is moral duty, which binds an 
individual by reason of the validity of a moral 
order. 
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Rights, for instance right to life, liberty, and 
security without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, colour, sex, religion and so on.16 Other 
theory, the legal positivism, asserts that legal 
rights exist only when legislature codifies the 
rights, it will not bind the person, unless the law 
already creates it, which is legal right.17 While, 
Roscoe Pound argues that the law does not 
create them, it only recognizes them. The more 
civilized the notion, the richer he is in rights; 
therefore, it is a pressure upon the law to meet 
these increasing scope and character of legal 
rights.18  
Brown asserts that there are several classes of 
person in law.19 In legal speaking, we can divide 
entities into two categories. First, persons20 and 
                                                                
16  United Nation, The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/. Last 
access at May 15, 2017. 
17  This theory is introduced by Kelsen in his famous 
"`The Pure Theory of Law" or "Legal Positivism" 
where he tried to purify law from natural law, or 
moral law, social, anthropological, history, 
political, and so on. Kelsen unlike natural law that 
view rights and obligations are two different 
things that come from different resources, asserts 
that right and duty are unity in the sense that it is 
specified by the law, See Hans Kelsen supra note 3 
at 495-496. See also James Goetz, ‘Natural Unity 
and Paradoxes of Legal Person’ (2013) 27 The 
Journal Jurisprudence at 31. 
18  Roscoe Pound, ‘Interest of Personality’ (1915) 28 
The Harvard Law Review 343 at 344. 
19  Brown, W. Jethro, ‘Personality of the Corporation 
and the State’ (1905) 21 Law Quarterly Review 365 
at 376. Also reprinted in (2008) 4 Journal of 
Institutional Economics 255.  
20  Legal persons are sometime addressed as moral 
persons or jural persons or juridical persons. It is 
used interchangeably. However, those words 
have emphasizing meaning, which are different 
from one to another.  French writers prefer to use 
‘Les Personnes Morales’ or moral persons, even 
until now, their Penal Code recognizes moral 
persons instead of legal persons.   
21  As noted by Austin that ‘a human being 
considered as invested with rights, or considered 
as subject to duties,’ see Hans Kelsen, General 
Theory…, supra note 7 at 94. There are many 
debates relating the ability of human being to 
qualify as person, the requirement of humanity. 
For example they are born and not yet dead, and 
secondly, non-persons. To put it simply, legal 
persons are someone or something which can act 
in law, and non-persons are ones or entities 
which cannot act in law. Fall into first category 
are real persons that are humans or natural 
persons;21 and artificial legal persons 
(sometimes address as fictitious legal person, 
even though these terminologies have different 
meanings), 22 such as corporations, universities, 
states, provinces, municipalities, religious 
bodies, association of government officials, 
social associations, etc.23  
In the second category there are human that are 
not accepted as person in law such as one with 
insanity,24 slaves and outlaws (outside the 
protection of law). Some literatures embrace the 
the meaning of born and dead are legally 
formulated with certain conditions. For example, 
do foetus, embryo or zygote be determine as 
person that carry the same constitutional legal 
rights and duties with men who has born? If it is 
included in the meaning of natural person in law, 
then, abortion, medical experiments on foetal 
parts will count as illegal activity. See Charles I. 
Lugosi, ‘Conforming to the Rule of Law: When 
Person and Human Being Finally Mean the Same 
Thing in Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence’ 
(2006) 22 Issues in Law and Medicine 119 at 125. 
See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, ‘The Plausibility 
of Personhood’ (2012) 74 Ohio State Law Journal 
13. 
22  Fictitious will refer to something that is not real 
and only there in the fantasy or imagination, like 
fiction novel, the story is there, but we cannot 
really see it in reality. While artificial indicate 
something that is made to imitate the real one, like 
artificial lake, it is meant to imitate the real lake 
but it is actually made by men, but we can see the 
lake, there is this artificial lake in front of our eyes. 
In this sense, of course artificial would be more 
suitable to address other legal persons besides 
human. However, the realist would not agree 
with the term artificial to address legal entity 
because according to realist, the development of 
normal group personality is essentially growth 
and not manufactured.   
23  Goetz, supra note 19 at 27 
24  In some cases ‘the insane’ can be held accountable 
criminally. For example to be put in compulsory 
detention, or sometimes the courts take the 
defence of mental illness as a reason for reducing 
the sentence. Wells, Corporations and Criminal 
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terminology of human nonperson for this 
category.25 They are human, but do not get the 
title of person in law. The history of slavery has 
developed issue of legal personality in human. If 
slaves are considered as person, how one could 
regards them as part of property.26 And the last 
category is legal non-person that is artificial. The 
examples of this type are partnerships, clubs, 
family that are not considered as having 
personality in law, particularly in civil law. They 
can acquire property for certain purposes, 
whether by will or by gift. The ability of 
obtaining this property consequently will arise 
rights and duties. They might also have 
psychological unity like corporations, but the 
law do not recognize it as person.27 Therefore 
legal person do not always human being, and 
being human does not guarantee that he/she be 
regarded as a person in law.  
To be a person, a particular legal regime may 
accommodate different requirements from 
another legal regime. The concept of who, what 
and what capacities should be possessed to be a 
person, can be discussed from historical, 
political, moral, philosophical, metaphysical, 
theological perspective. Theological 
philosophers view person as sacred being that 
must be respected and protected. This notion 
tends to include a foetus as person. Health law 
often embraces the meaning of person as this 
sacred being.28 Liberal moral philosophers claim 
that person is a moral agent, an intelligent and 
reflective being who can make rational choices. 
This conception greatly influenced the notion of 
person in the field of law, particularly criminal 
law; with the idea of responsible agent that can 
be accountable for the crimes they committed. 
Whereas legalists reject all form of metaphysical 
theories; to them, person simply entities that 
bear legal rights and duties.    
 
 
                                                                
Responsibility, 2cd edition (Oxford Univerisy 
Press, 2001) at 65. 
25  For example Harvard Law Review’s Notes, When 
We Talk about When We Talk about Persons: The 
Language of a Legal Fiction, (2001) 114 Harvard 
Law Review 1745 at 1747. 
26  Ibid. 
27  Brown, supra note 21 at 258. 
2.2.2 The Theory of Person and Legal Person 
What requirements do legal theorists provide to 
clarify which substance is person in the eye of 
law, who bear rights and duties, and who is not 
included as person, are still very unclear. The 
conception that anything can be a person, must 
essentially acquire certain conditions, the 
existence of which is necessary to constitute 
anything a person. Particularly for criminal law, 
this examination will also answer the question of 
what kind of entities that can hold responsibility 
for a crime. Naffine in her work "Who are Law's 
Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible 
Subjects to Responsible Cats,"29 identifies three 
approaches regarding how law defines legal 
person. The first, legal person in the meaning of 
legal formal meaning, secondly, person as a 
reasonable creature, and third, person is a 
responsible subject. 
The first theory describes legal personality as the 
ability of legal person to have formal capacity to 
bear the legal rights in order to participate in 
legal relations.30  Legal persons are not different 
entities of their rights and obligations, but it is a 
personification of unity, and because the rights 
and obligations of a legal person, in this context 
also called unity personification of a set of legal 
norms.31 According to this definition, we should 
see physical and juristic person as identical in 
nature, because person is not seen from whether 
they have physic or psychological matter, but 
person is seen as the bearer of the rights and 
duties that is norm complexes.32 Moreover, 
regarding the freedom or autonomy of the 
physical person, which is comparable to 
freedom of the will, this theory does not accept 
it as part of legal theory, instead it is said to be a 
political theory as the fundamental quality of the 
State.33 Proponents of this definition, tend to 
view purely legal character by separating legal 
theory from moral, social, political and historical 
aspects. Person exists only as a capacity to 
28  Naffine, Legal Theory…, supra note 5. 
29   Ngaire Naffine, ‘Who are Law’s Persons? From 
Cheshire Cats to Responsible Cats to Responsible 
Subjects’ (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 346. 
30  Ibid at 350. 
31  Kelsen, Pure Theory…, supra note 6 at 91.  
32  Kelsen , General Theory…, supra note 7 at 496. 
33  Ibid at 497. 
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operate in law, granted the competence by the 
law itself. 34  
With this understanding, then anything could 
possess legal personality because legal persons 
designated or defined by the law. So, it could 
include animals, foetuses, dead people, 
environment, corporate, whatever according to 
law necessary to be included into legal persons. 
There is no particular character that makes the 
difference between being and non-being that 
keeps them from becoming persons. There is no 
special character to become persons. One object 
can be person enough when legal gives them the 
ability to bear the formal rights or obligations. 
According to Kelsen, ‘persons exist as long as 
they have the rights and obligations; regardless 
of whether they do not even have the 
existence.’35  Ideally, in this condition, law have 
to be responsive to the progress of the 
civilization, where the growth of law and the 
growth of individual interest walk together.  
However, as Pound said that often the 
recognition of individual or social interests 
relatively late in the development of law.36  
The second definition of legal persons is being 
reasonable. This notion is generally accepted as 
a formal legal sense of the persons. One thing 
that is conventionally accepted in law that a 
person may be subject to law at the time he/she 
was born and it stops being legal subject as its 
whole brain dies.37 The dominant conception of 
person in this second sense described by 
Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) with, vera persona 
est rei rationabilis individua substantia38 In this 
meaning every last word (rationalist, individual, 
substantia) has a technical definition where the 
discussion back to the concept of metaphysics by 
                                                                
34  Ibid. 
35  Kelsen, Pure Theory…, supra note 6 at 93. 
36  Pound, supra note 20 at 348.  
37  Naffine, Who are Law’s Person…, supra note 30 at 
357. 
38  Cited from Dewey, supra note 9 at 666.  
39  Aristotle of Greece (385 atau 384 B.C.-322 B.C) 
affirms ‘man is subject to nature in as much as he is a 
part of the universe and, therefore, subject to the laws 
of matter and creation and man is subject to nature in 
as much as he dominates it by his spirit. His spirit 
enables him to will freely and, therefore, to distinguish 
between good and evil.’ Cited from Surya Prakash 
Aristotle; regarding the nature of beings, indeed, 
is a very interesting topic for philosophers in the 
Middle Ages.  
Reasonable means endowed with a natural 
ability to choose, as described by Aristotle that 
humans, as part of their natural properties must 
have free will.39 Similar in many ways is the 
´principle of alternative possibilities´, according 
to which an individual may proper be held 
responsible for conduct only if he or she could 
have done otherwise. In criminal law, relating to 
the theory of responsibility, it is not fair to 
punish someone who has no capacity to 
understand what he/she is doing or has no 
capacity to will something that is evil. Therefore 
one can be liable for an action only if he/she has 
fundamental idea of fairness and individual 
liberty when did that action. That is why in some 
situations like self-defending against attack, or 
under duress, or suffer mental incapacity may 
remove criminal liability. 40  
This human freedom according to Immanuel 
Kant led to moral and moral determination that 
can be said a self-determining moral agent.41 
Moral in human beings differentiate them from 
inanimate objects or living things such as plants 
or animals. Therefore, when humans have 
reasonable element with free will; it can be said 
that they are autonomous individual; described 
as a separate, distinct and possess 
individualism.42 Moore argues that to be the 
subjects of criminal law, it must at least be 
rational agents that possess autonomy in four 
different senses: emotionality, unified character, 
Sinha, Jurisprudence: Legal Philosophy (West 
Publishing Co, 1993) at 86-87. 
40  J. Fischer, ‘Responsibility and Control’ (1982) 79 
Journal of Philosophy 24. See also Nicola Lacey, 
‘In Search of the Responsible Subject: History, 
Philosophy and Social Science in Criminal Law 
Theory, (2001) 64 The Modern Law Review 350 at 
353. 
41  Immanuel Kant (1724-1808), cited from Freeman, 
Llyod’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, 7th edition, 
(Sweet & Maxwell Limited, 2004) at 118. 
42  Philippe Ducor, ‘The Legal Status of Human 
Materials’ (1996) 44 Drake Law Review 195 at 200. 
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unified consciousness, and intentionality.43 With 
the reason that someone has, he can limit his 
personal demand that interfere the interest of 
others.44 For example, with the reason that 
someone has, he/she will not take someone 
else´s property just because he/she wants it.  
Since rights and obligations encompass rational 
choice, the involvement of ‘rational 
individuated substance’ in the concept of person 
survived long after metaphysics and theology. 
French is one of the countries who consistently 
put moral personhood to be the meeting place 
for theories of group personality.45 Although 
this concept according to Kelsen has the 
ambiguity of the mixing concept between 
human and person, humans and persons are 
different concepts from different 
considerations.46 Human according to him exists 
in biological and psychological concept or in 
natural sciences, while person is a concept in law 
that refers to a social role, from the analysis of 
legal norms.47  
The third theory about legal personality is the 
responsible subject. According to this 
understanding, not all men (human beings) are 
eligible to be the persons, but only a rational and 
competent by law. According to Lacey, the 
second theory that focuses in the idea about 
human being and a set of values as rational and 
self-determining moral agent, fails to account 
the idea of responsibility and that the subjective, 
capacity conception is only one among others 
possible interpretations of human 
responsibility.48 As Richard Tour employs the 
term ‘full legal personality’ which requires the 
person to be able to initiate an action in court, 
sue and be sued. 49 Meanwhile, according to 
Matthew Kramer, mentally competent human 
                                                                
43  Michael S. Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of the 
Criminal law, (Oxford University Press, 2010) at 
611.  
44  Pound, supra note 20 at 355.  
45  In its Penal Code Article 121-2, French defines: 
“Moral persons (Les personnes morales), with the 
exception of the State, are criminally liable for the 
offenses committed on their account by their organs or 
representatives . . . in the cases provided for by statute 
or regulations.” 
46  Kelsen, Pure Theory...., supra note 6 at 94  
47  Ibid. 
adults are potential right holders where 
considerable moral significance attaches and can 
personally responsible for his/her civil and 
criminal actions.50 When compared with the first 
theory, then in this third concept, there is an 
active subject and moral beings that is separated 
from the relationship: he who determines his 
will, which holds and determine its rights and 
the holder of a separate and distinct rights. 
Legal persons according to the third theory is in 
line with the understanding of person proposed 
by John Locke, in which the actions and 
qualifications is owned only by the intelligence 
agent, capable of law, can be happy and sad.51 In 
other words, according to the third theory, legal 
person is intelligence agent and moral agent that 
can be responsible for his/her actions. In moral 
context, person is an individual who can make 
decisions and able to execute that decision 
independently. Additionally, in legal context, 
that person has the right to make decisions and 
execute it.52  
The third theory, which explains person as 
responsible subject, who has sufficient mental 
determination to consider his/her actions and 
can be accountable for all rational choices that 
he/she made, is the most acceptable concept 
about person in criminal law. Because criminal 
law discuss specifically subject who can commit 
a crime, able to be responsible for that act, and 
can bear criminal sanction.  
As we have discussed some theories about legal 
personality, now, we will scrutinize issues 
regarding group of people personality, which is 
part of non-human legal subjects. We only focus 
on this legal person because criminal law accepts 
both natural person and group of people as 
person. Issue regarding group legal personality 
48  Lacey, supra note 42 at 357. 
49  Naffine, Who are Law’s Person…, supra note 30 at 
347.  
50  M. H. Kramer, ‘Do Animals and Dead People 
Have Legal Rights?’ (2001) 14 Canadian Journal of 
Law and Jurisprudence 29 at 36. 
51  Naffine, Who are Law’s Person…, supra note 30 at 
347.   
52  C.N. Nana, Constantine Ntsanyu. Corporate 
Criminal Liability in the United Kingdom: 
Determining the Appropriate Mechanism of 
Imputation (Robert Gordon University, 2009) at 44. 
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observes on how to associate human as natural 
person in law with other juristic persons. This 
discussion may be parallel to the topic of 
animal53, intelligent agent54, or foetus55 as legal 
person. However this paper will focus only to 
the discussion of organizations as person in law. 
Organizations are association of people, such as 
business corporations, non-profit oriented 
organizations, states, universities, and so forth. 
The basic question is, whether this juristic 
person has mental element that give them the 
ability for moral consideration,56 as being 
possessed by natural person, so they can be 
liable of its conduct.  
Corporations have a unique characteristic, as 
Iwai argues that it is at the same time both a 
person and a thing; because it has the propensity 
to own and be owned. Corporation owns all 
asset of the corporation, which also can be done 
by a natural person; however, unlike natural 
person, who cannot be owned, corporation is in 
fact, and cannot be denied is owned by the 
shareholders.57  
French distinguishes different types of 
collective, the aggregate and the corporation.58 
An aggregate collectivise is a mere collection of 
people such as gang which cannot be seen as a 
moral agent. An aggregate identity will change 
whenever there is a change in its membership. A 
                                                                
53  Generally, animals do not account to be a legal 
person in criminal law. However, there are some 
rare cases that hold an animal to be liable of a 
crime. For example, a case in Argentina, a dog was 
sentenced to life in imprisonment for killing a 
three years old child of the owner. Cited from 
Wells, supra note 26 at 65.  
54  There are some discussion about the possibility to 
make computers and robots with its intelligent 
agent may be liable in criminal law because it is 
considered to have the same legal capacity with 
human. See for example Andrade, Francisco, et al. 
‘Contracting agents: legal personality and 
representation’ (2007) 15 Artificial Intelligence 
and Law 357 at 371. See also Peter M. Asaro, 
‘Robots and Responsibility from a Legal 
Perspective’ (2007) Working Paper University of 
Umea Sweden, can be accessed at 
http://www.peterasaro.org/writing/ 
55  Many scholars are in the opinion that foetus in the 
womb should be regarded as a person under the 
law, and should get all the rights as human being 
corporation is a collective of individuals whose 
identity is not related to the identities of the 
members. Accordingly, to be a moral agent, a 
group of people should be able to have its own 
intentionality, or corporate intention that can be 
found in the corporation´s internal decision 
making structure.59 As Austin describes that 
responsibility is based on intentionality. 
The establishment of legal persons has been 
there for a long time. The state was the first legal 
person that is recognized by law.60 State 
currently classified as a form of organization 
that has legal personality. This also true for 
state’s subordinate, such as provinces, cities, 
regencies, state’s departments, state’s agencies 
and so forth. Looking at a state as a different 
legal person from its constituent is easier than 
observe it from a business organization. If, for 
example, a state owed some money, its citizens 
would not carry out the loan, and even if half of 
its citizen immigrates to another country, no one 
would have thought to pursue the citizens to 
pay his/her country´s debt.61    
Initially, non-human legal person is addressed 
as juristic person; the term of the fictitious 
person was occupied. The conception of 
fictitious person is a legacy from the Roman law, 
constructed and elaborated by the religious 
lawyers of the Middle Ages, and presented on 
who have been born. See further Lugosi, supra 
note 23 at 125. See also Paulsen, supra note 23.  
56  Moral consideration sometimes being discussed 
with the topic of ”Moral Considerability”. See for 
example Mark H. Bernstein, On Moral 
Considerability: An Essay On Who Morally Matters 
(1998). 
57  Katsuhito Iwai, ‘Persons, Things and 
Corporations: The Corporate Personality 
Controversy and Comparative Corporate 
Governance’ (1999) 47 The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 583 at 589-590.  
58  French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility 
(Columbia University Press, 1984), at 8 
59  Ibid at 39. 
60  Ugo Pagano, ‘Legal Person: the evolution of 
fictitious species’ (2010) 2 Journal of Institutional 
Economics 117 at 119. 
61  Goerge F. Deiser, ‘The Juristic Person. I’ (1908) 57 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review and 
American Law Register 131 at 134. 
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modern legal thought by Savigny. The theory 
has no concern for members and accordingly, 
the fictitious person cannot exist except by virtue 
of some act of the state. In the development, this 
theory was evaluated by the reductionist that is 
popular in the second half of the nineteenth 
century that holds that corporations are 
aggregates of natural person.62 And then, the 
examination of the legal literature criticized 
those two theories, by the realist such as Beseler 
and Gierke who set up an analysis of the 
conception of the corporation as a personality 
based not on Roman, but on a priori principle.63 
The real entity theory heated discussions from 
around 1900 to 1930. On this view, the 
corporation is neither a fiction nor an aggregate 
but a non-reducible real entity.    
Therefore, generally there are three main 
approaches to explain the personality of group 
of people: formalist (concessionary) theory, 
reductionist (atomistic) theory and realist 
(holistic) theory.64 In the formalist view, the 
personality of the organization is there because 
it is given by the state, so it is an exclusive 
creation of the law. The organization is like a 
reflection of the political state that gives it 
existence, constituted an autonomous 
institutional actor separable from those with an 
interest in it.65  It is often associated with this 
view that the entity itself is not real, artificial 
being, invisible, intangible, so it is just a fictitious 
thing. Thus, the organization is simply an 
artificial description or an imaginary legal 
person that exists only in contemplation of law.66 
                                                                
62  David Gindis, ‘From Fictions and Aggregates to 
Real Entities in the Theory of the Firm’ (2009) 5 
Journal of Institutional Economics 25 at 26.  
63  Deiser, supra note 63 at 136-137. 
64  Meir Dan-Cohen, ‘Epilogue on Corporate 
Personhood and Humanity’ (2013) 16 New 
Criminal Law Review 300 at 302. See also Jothan 
A. Marcantel, ‘The Corporation as a ”Real” 
Constitutional Person’ (2011) 11 US Davis 
Business Law Journal 221 at 222. Sometimes, the 
reductionist (atomistic) theory also addresses as 
the partnership theory and realist (holistic) theory 
that is also called entity theory. See Margaret M. 
Blair, “Corporate Personhood and the Corporate 
Persona” (2013) 3 University of Illinois Law 
Review 785 at 807.  
They are given the position as independent 
individual according to the law, as given to 
companies, non-profit institutions, universities, 
hospitals, organization with cooperative, such as 
insurance, private clubs, and even to 
government agencies, such as city, province, 
state institution, state companies such as post 
office, state telecommunication, state television 
and so on.67 Accordingly, corporation is no more 
and no less than what the law made it to be  
Reductionist explains that organization or entity 
refer to aggregate of individuals and the 
interaction that occur between those individuals 
in that combined entity.68 Further, this 
reductionist theory can be divided into 
aggregate view and nexus of contracts view. 
According to aggregate view, organization´s 
property is property of the constituent entities, 
while in contractual view, the organization is a 
contract among the members.69 Contract is 
broadly understood as any voluntary agreement 
involving some sort of exchange. Therefore 
corporation is a voluntary coalition of 
individuals, and a collection of contracts 
between various owners; it legally treated as 
persons signing the various contracts involved 
in the nexus.70  Accordingly, corporations were 
emerged not because of the state, it was simply 
as individuals joined together to undertake 
some business enterprises, the basis is more like 
partnerships.71 Moreover, organization can be 
said as assemble or collection of wealth or assets 
as proposed by Grossman and Hart.72 The 
corporation consists of those assets that it owns 
65  Larry Catà Backer, ‘The Autonomous Global 
Corporation: On the Role of Organizational Law 
Beyond Asset Partitioning and Legal Personality’ 
(2005) 41 Tulsa Law Review 541 at 542. 
66  Michael Jensen and William Meckling, ‘Theory of 
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial 
Economics 305 at 310. 
67  Ibid. 
68  Cohen, supra note 66 at 302  
69  Ibid. 
70  Gindis, supra note 64 at 27-29. 
71  Blair, supra note 66 at 804. 
72  Sanford J. Grossman dan Oliver D. Hart, ‘The Cost 
and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical 
and Lateral Integration’ (1986) 94 Journal of 
Political Economy 691 at 692. 
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or over which it has control. Therefore, to 
identify a corporation, is to look at its assets.  
The last theory regarding legal entities 
personality is realist theory. Within the last 
decade of the nineteenth century, scholars began 
to articulate the idea that corporations were real 
entities that came as a result of the nature 
tendency of human beings to organize 
themselves into groups.73 According to realist, a 
collective entity is a real and natural entity just 
as real as individuals.74 It is an organic social 
reality with separate and distinct bodies that 
possessed their own values and desires 
independent of its changing shareholders.75 It is 
an autonomous, self-sufficient and self-
renewing body, and it can determine and 
enforce it common will. It regards the 
corporation as a unit recognized in the law with 
its individual characteristic, like those of natural 
person. This theory refuses to reduce reality into 
individuals and relationship among those 
individuals. Corporation is more than either a 
creation of the state or just an aggregate of the 
shareholders.76 
When we say that corporate person is not a legal 
fiction, we imply that it is a representation of 
physical realities, which the law recognizes 
rather than creates.77 Even Machen argues that 
the corporation existed prior to law; all the law 
can do is to recognize it or refuse to recognize 
it.78 When two, three, four or more body of men 
unite themselves together to act in a particular 
way for common purpose, they create a body, 
which by no fiction, but by the very nature of 
things, differs from the individuals of whom it is 
constituted.79  
2.2.3 Persons in Criminal Law 
Somewhat confusing when connecting existing 
legal subject concept, which mean the bearer of 
legal rights and duties, with legal subject within 
the context of criminal law. In general, criminal 
                                                                
73  Mark M. Hager, ‘Essays on Bodies Politic: The 
Progressive History of Organizational "Real 
Entity" Theory"’ (1988) 50 University of Pittsburgh 
Law Review 575.   
74  Arthur W. Machen, ‘Corporate Personality 
(continued)’ (1911) 24 Harvard Law Review 347 at 
363. 
75  Marcantel, supra note 66 at 228. 
law regulate act that is prohibited to be done by 
its legal subject in social life; it concerns with 
individual defendant as author of acts and 
omissions. If the subject did what is forbidden or 
abandoned its obligations, then the person will 
get punishment from the state. Thus, in the 
context of criminal law, the subject of law is 
consequently the subject of the norms or 
addressee of the provision (norm addressat) or 
who is required to do or not to do something.  
If there is someone who is obligated to do 
something to others, then, the norm addresat is 
the first one, the person who is obligated to do 
something, and not the last one. In this case, the 
person who owns the right is the object of the 
provision.80 For instance, article 21 of Indonesian 
law on Conservation of Biological Resources and 
Ecosystems, declares that ‘everyone is 
prohibited from catching, harming, killing, 
storing, processing, maintaining, transporting 
and selling protected animals alive.’ Norm 
addressat of this provision is ‘everyone’, while 
‘the protected animals’ are object of the norm. 
The protected animals are right holders, 
because, under this act, it has right not to be 
arrested, injured, killed, and so on. If we adopt 
formalist view, the protected animal in this case, 
may be referred as the subject of law because it 
has legal rights or the legal right holder. 
Therefore, criminal law subjects are narrower 
than legal subjects, since, it does not only 
concern with subject with legal rights and/or 
duties, but criminal law also takes into account 
the ability and capacity of the subject to act, be 
responsible, and be punishable.  
Nowadays, laws regard all natural persons as 
having legal personality, although their ability 
to be responsible criminally may vary according 
to their age and status.81 Some individuals, who 
are in fact legal persons, may be excluded from 
criminal liability, such as the young and the 
lunatic.82 And in the Ancient time for some cases 
76  Blair, supra note 66 at 806. 
77  Brown, supra note 21 at 372. 
78  Machen, supra note 76 at 361. 
79  Deiser, supra note 63 at 133.   
80  Kelsen, Pure Theory.., supra note 6 at 128. 
81  Wells, supra note 26 at 81. 
82  Being legal person does not make it automatically 
responsible in criminal law. In relation with 
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there were also slaves and women who were 
omitted from the meaning of subject. Moreover, 
in the criminal law of Ancient Roman, the 
magistrates in office who had imperium, were 
totally immune from criminal accusations 
during, their term; that is also true for the 
emperor.83 However, nowadays, criminal law 
hold that in the meaning of persons, includes 
natural persons and legal persons. It cannot be 
denied that political pragmatism shapes so 
many decisions about criminal policy.84 
Pertaining what kind of organization that can be 
served as criminal legal subject, Indonesian 
drafted Penal Code and some existed 
regulations use corporation terminology to 
accommodate legal person other than natural 
person. These laws explain corporation as 
‘organized group of persons and/or property, 
either has legal personality or no legal 
personality.85 We will scrutinize two aspects of 
this regulation, first, to examine the utilization of 
the terminology of corporation, and secondly to 
connect the meaning of corporation that is 
embraced by the legislators to group personality 
theories that we have discuss previously. 
The concept of corporation is discussed in depth 
because it is the contemporary terminology used 
by many Indonesian new laws to refer to legal 
person. To find out the meaning and definition 
of corporation, I will investigate the history of 
the concept and accumulate many definitions of 
this terminology from various academic sources.  
Historically, corporations were created to 
regulate the Roman Catholic Church and other 
religious institutions in Europe in middle ages.86 
                                                                
corporations, being legal persons, do not make 
corporations automatically liable, unless it 
deserves punishment because of its conduct. See 
Joan MacLeod Heminway, ‘Thoughts on the 
Corporation as a Person for Purposes of Corporate 
Criminal Liability, (2011) 41 Stetson Law Review 
137 at 144. 
83  O.F. Robinson, The Criminal Law of Ancient Rome 
(Duckworth, 1995) at 16.  
84  Nicola Lacey, ‘Principles, Policies, and Politics of 
Criminal Law’ in Lucia Zedner and Julian V. 
Roberts (eds), Principles and Values in Criminal Law 
and Criminal Justice: Essays in Honour of Andrew 
Ashworth  (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2012) at 20. 
The institutions were granted personality by 
charter issued by local authority or by the king. 
With such charter, the religious institution can 
operate as an independent entity and can hold 
properties in its own name. With this feature, 
guaranteed the certainty that the property will 
not be inherited to the decedents of the member 
who administered and controlled the property 
on behalf of the institutions. Moreover, it will 
ensure that the property will not be returned to 
the authorities if the administers died.87 
Therefore, with the issuing of the charter, assert 
that institutions are independent entities that 
have long-term sustainability.  
This concept, where a group of people can act 
together as single entity with an unlimited 
lifetime, at least for the benefit of owning 
property or wealth, then applied to a city or 
municipality or community group. Until the 
sixteenth century, corporations were used for 
various institutions such as cities, districts, 
universities, colleges, hospitals, social 
organizations, bishops, deans, monasteries, and 
other institutions.88 Besides the intention of 
continues sustainability, another goal of the 
establishment of a corporation is for the purpose 
of self-governance. For example, the charter 
issued to municipalities in the Middle Ages 
explicitly given for the purpose of this 
management independency. 
Margaret M. Blair asserts that the word 
corporations come from the Latin word corpus, 
meaning body, because the law recognized the 
group of people who formed the corporation 
85  Indonesian Ministry of Law and Human Rights, 
The Draft of National Penal Code, 2015, Article 
190, see also Indonesia, Law No. 31/1999 on the 
Eradication of Corruption art 1. 
86  M. Blair, supra note 66  
87  As Mark explains that by giving a charter to an 
institution, there will be distinction between 
public property and private property that cannot 
be mixed up. See Gregory A. Mark, ‘The 
Personification of the Business Corporation in 
American Law’ (1987) 54 University of Chicago 
Law Review at 1449  
88  Ron Harris, Industrializing English Law: 
Entrepreneurship and Business Organizations, 1720 – 
1844 (Cambrige University Press, 2000) at 1459. 
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could act as one body or one legal person.89 It 
reveals the process of giving a body to 
something through the mechanism of 
incorporation.90 Formally, Robert Hessen 
affirms that corporations, unlike other 
organizations, are creature of the state because 
they require governmental permission to exist.91 
This approach also accommodated by Black’s 
Law Dictionary that states that corporation is an 
entity having authority under law to act as a 
single person, a group or succession of persons 
established in accordance with legal rules into a 
legal or juristic person that has a legal 
personality distinct from the natural persons 
who make it up, and has the legal powers 
according to its constitution.92 
From the above meanings, it can be understand 
that corporation is legal entity that has legal 
personality, independent from its members, 
obtained its personality in accordance with the 
applicable law. It is confirmed that not all 
collective groups are corporations, such as ‘trust’ 
as it is known in Western civil law, cannot be 
called corporation but unincorporated body. 
This concept is very important to be highlighted 
to provide an understanding that corporations 
are not the same as unincorporated bodies or 
groups of peoples, which cannot be called legal 
person.  
Initially, the notion of corporation includes all 
forms of organized group that have legal 
personality. For example, states, social purpose 
corporations, business oriented corporations, or 
corporations engage in religious affairs. 
However, in economic and business field, the 
terminology of corporation shaped into a more 
narrow meaning. Post, Preston and, Sachs 
explain that corporation is ‘an organization 
                                                                
89  M. Blair, supra note 66 at. 788. 
90  Christopher Harding, Criminal Enterprise: 
Individuals, Organisations And Criminal 
Responsibility (Willian Publishing. 2007) at 33. 
91  Robert Hessen, In Defense of the Corporation, 
Second Printing (Hoover Institution Press, 1979) 
at xiv. 
92  Bryan A. Garner (editor in Chief), Black’s Law 
Dictionary, ninth Edition (Thomson Reuter, 2009) 
at 391. 
engage in mobilizing resources for productive 
uses in order to create wealth and other benefits 
for its multiple constituents or stakeholders.’93 
Many experts in the United States in discussing 
the corporation refer to big business, and not to 
the other forms of associations. For example, 
Peter F. Drucker affirms that corporations are 
large-scale business enterprise usually owned in 
corporate form.94 According to Gower, 
lawmakers in the United States prefer to use the 
term of corporation to refer to business entity, 
compared to the lawmakers in the United 
Kingdom who tend to use the term of 
company.95 This principle can also be found in 
Australia, where experts when discussing 
corporation law, refer to big business, which 
existence requires the incorporation process.96 
Although in general the corporation is a group 
of persons acting as a legal entity that have legal 
personality, there are exceptions to that concept. 
Maitland clarifies that in history and theory of 
law, the terminology of corporation is not 
always an aggregate corporation, but it also 
recognizes sole corporations, which attached not 
to collective but to particular individual. 
Corporation sole, first applied to a parish church 
(rector ecclesiae parochialis), and then the title is 
also given to king or the crown. Pursuant to 
Blair, the purpose of establishing corporation 
sole is to make clear that the controlled property 
is not a private property, but relating to such 
corporation sole position and all contracts made 
are not in their personal position, but as their 
official capacity in the corporation sole. So that 
all properties, rights, and obligations arising 
from contract made by the corporation sole, will 
be proceeded to the successor of the 
93  J.E. Post, L.E Preston, and S. Sachs, Redefining the 
Corporation (Standford University Press, 2002) at 
17. 
94  See Peter F. Drucker, Concept of the Corporation, 
Seventh Printing, (Transaction Publisher, 2008) at 
4. 
95  See Gower, L.C.B. ‘Some Contrast Between British 
and American Corporation Law’ (1956) 69 
Harvard Law Review 1369. 
96  Roman Tomasic, Stephen Bottomley & Rob 
Mcqueen, Corporations Law in Australia. Second 
Edition. (The Federation Press, 2002) at 5. 
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corporation.97 However, Maitland affirms that 
the concept of corporate sole itself is the reckless 
development of the theory of corporation as 
persona ficta98.  
Indonesian drafted Penal Code explains 
corporation as “organized group of persons 
and/or property, either has legal personality or 
no legal personality.”99 This definition gives 
broader meaning of corporation, as it is 
understood earlier, where corporation is legal 
entity that has legal personality. It may include 
generally, a group of people like clubs, 
associations, partnerships, do not have legal 
existence separate from its individual members. 
In this meaning corporation of course goes 
beyond that definition, and include not only 
profit oriented company, but also states, 
governmental bodies, political parties, unions, 
non-profit organizations, non-economic 
orientation public authorities, all types of 
organizations. Organizations that exist for the 
reason of managing governmental powers are 
known as public corporations. Those that are 
organized for the purpose of enriching private 
individuals are known as private 
corporations.100 Therefore subject of criminal 
law have autonomous meaning than that of civil 
law.  
Countries like the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Singapore, and New 
Zealand, accept the distinction between 
corporations and unincorporated bodies. This 
can be seen from how these countries elaborate 
the meaning of its person. For instance, The 
United States in its Model Penal Code, §1.13, 
General Definitions, subtitle (8) states that 
“person, he and actor include any natural person 
and, where relevant, a corporation or an 
unincorporated association.” In US Code, Title 1, 
Chapter 1, § 1, describes the “words person and 
whoever include corporations, companies, 
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and 
joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”   
                                                                
97  M. Blair, supra note 66 at 789-790. 
98  Maitland, State, Trust and Corporation edited by 
David Runciman and Magnus Ryan (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) at xvi. 
The United Kingdom, in its Interpretation Act of 
1978, explains, ‘The word person includes a 
body of persons corporate or unincorporated.’ 
Furthermore, when viewing its Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, 
also demonstrate the different position of 
corporations and non-legal entities such as 
partnership, trade union, or employers’ 
associations. This act does not occupy the 
terminology of corporation or legal person, but 
organizations. The objective is to accommodate 
not only corporations or legal person but also to 
encompass entities without legal personality as 
the normadresat of this act.  
Canadian Penal Code 2004, also embraces the 
terminology of organization to address group of 
peoples that can be subject to criminal law. As 
Section 2, 22.1 states that “everyone, person, and 
owner, and similar expressions, include Her 
Majesty and an organization.” The meaning of 
organizations described by this act is also not 
equating the corporation (body corporate) with 
other associations without legal personality. As 
this act explains that organizations are: ‘(a) a 
public body, body corporate, society, company, 
firm, partnership, trade union or municipality, 
or (b) an association of persons that (i) is created 
for common purpose, (ii) has an operational 
structure, and (iii) holds itself out to the public 
as an association of persons.’ 
Furthermore, Indonesian drafted penal code 
section 214 states that persons are natural 
persons including corporations. It is interesting 
to see that not many countries put plainly 
corporations and natural persons side by side as 
subject to criminal law. Countries with civil law 
backgrounds do not use this terminology to refer 
to subjects other than human. The terms juristic 
person, legal person, or moral person are the 
terminologies most commonly used to define 
the organization through which corporate action 
is affected. For example, in Dutch Penal Code, 
natural person is contrasted with legal persons or 
rechtspersonen, where Dutch Penal Code at 
99  Indonesian Ministry of Law and Human Rights, 
The Draft of National Penal Code, 2015, Article 
190 see also Indonesia, Law No. 31/1999 on the 
Eradication of Corruption art 1. 
100  Deiser supra note 63 at 135. 
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Article 51 (1) states that “offences can be committed 
by natural persons and legal persons 
(rechtspersonen)”. French Penal Code occupies 
the terminology of moral persons (Les personnes 
morales), it is articulated at Article 121-2 that 
“Moral persons (Les personnes morales), with the 
exception of the State, are criminally liable for the 
offenses committed on their account by their organs 
or representatives according to the distinctions set 
out in articles 121-4 and 121-7.” 
Indonesia is comparable to Australia in putting 
corporation alongside with natural person as 
legal subject. In Australian Legislation Act 2001, 
section 160 (1) declares, “References to people 
generally includes a reference to a body politic 
or corporate as well as an individual.” More 
specifically, Australian Criminal Code 2002, 
section 49 (1) states, ‘This Act applies to 
corporations as well as individuals.’ Neither 
Australian Criminal Code nor Australian 
Legislation Act provides the meaning of 
corporation. However, the meaning of 
corporation can be found in Australian 
Corporation Act 2001, section 57 A states that 
corporation includes company, body corporate, 
an unincorporated body that may sue or be 
sued, or may hold property. However, 
according to this act, public authority and 
corporation sole are excluded from the 
terminology. 
It is not easy to give a complete definition of a 
terminology where it has developed into 
something different from its literal meaning. 
Hart affirms that there is often a difference 
between the meanings of a term in law with the 
same term outside the law. Even though they are 
interconnected in some aspects. As Hart states 
that ‘Corporation, right or duty… do not have 
the straightforward connection with 
counterparts in the world of fact which most 
ordinary words have and to which we appeal in 
our definition of ordinary words.’101 
From the justifications described, the 
elaboration of the terminology of corporation 
conveyed by some experts, and from the 
analysis of several laws from some countries, I 
                                                                
101 HLA Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953) at 5. 
agree with Taslitz stating that corporation is 
undoubtedly the most striking organization 
treating as legal person and is a legal paradigm 
of a collective entity.102 If using the basic theory 
of personality of corporation, which states that 
corporation is the result of the process of 
incorporating where it has the personality before 
the law after that incorporation mechanism, thus 
it is inappropriate to adopt the term corporation 
for an entity that is not eligible to be called a 
corporation. I argue that term corporation is a 
term that has been solid for only legal entities 
that have been through a process of 
incorporation. Whereas associations that have 
no status as legal person is usually referred as 
unincorporated body. If we reconsider the 
theory of legal personality and if we want to 
make legal construction by utilizing this theory 
seriously, it is imprecise to parallel natural 
person with corporation. It will be more 
appropriate to embrace legal person or moral 
person, which includes corporation. 
If we examine article 51 (3) of Dutch Penal Code 
declares that ‘equal status as a legal person 
applies to a company without legal personality, 
a partnership, a firm of ship owners, and a 
separate capital sum assembled for a special 
purposes.’ It can be determined that 
theoretically organizations without legal 
personality are different with organizations with 
legal personality. Though, their status is 
equalized for the benefit of the practice of 
criminal law in the Netherlands. This is different 
with Indonesia on how it elaborates the status of 
legal person, where it embraces the terminology 
of corporation and defined it as organized group 
of people and/or wealth, with or without legal 
status. It is clear that corporation is defined and 
interpreted without full understanding 
regarding its history and philosophical 
development.  
Assuming that the lawmakers wish to remove 
the dichotomy of the legal personality at all, by 
not discriminating between organizations with 
legal personality and organizations without 
legal personality status, and treat them equally 
102  Andrew E. Taslitz, ‘Reciprocity And The Criminal 
Responsibility Of Corporations’ (2012) 41 Stetson 
Law Review 73 at 75. 
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in criminal law, I suggest adopting the term 
organizations to refer to collective actors in all its 
forms. Thus, in elaborating criminal liability to 
an organization, we do not puzzle with the 
theory of legal personality, whether an 
organization has legal personality or not, but the 
characteristics of organizations that will be the 
focused of the consideration. As some countries 
with its recent enacted laws, are prefer to adopt 
the terminology of organizations to refer to 
collective actors. As discussed above, for 
instance, Canadian Criminal Code 2004, UK 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide Act 2007, UK Bribery Act 2010, and 
United States Guidelines Manual 2005. 
Corresponding to the legal explanations given 
by Canadian Department of Justice, the term 
person or corporation do not cover all forms of 
bodies that may commit a criminal offence, the 
most suitable form to accommodate all forms of 
collective group that is subject to criminal code 
is organization. 
3. Conclusion 
Person as the bearer of legal rights and duties 
can include many entities that the law perceives 
sufficient enough to bear it. However, person in 
criminal law context means someone or 
something with the ability to reason, someone 
who can make free choices of some foreseen 
consequences. Criminal law theories distinguish 
offender, responsible agent and punishable 
agent. In analysing each subject of the criminal 
law, it is important to be able to identify which 
legal subject that can be an offender, responsible 
agent and punishable agent. Since not all 
subjects may commit a crime, not all offenders 
can be criminally liable for their actions, and not 
all responsible offenders are punishable. 
Organizations have been accepted as legal 
subject in criminal law regime that may bear 
legal rights and duties, and may engage in legal 
relations. Organizations as independent legal 
subjects have specific objectives in interacting 
with other legal subjects. They may commit 
criminal acts to obtain those objectives, so they 
should be accountable for such acts, and incur 
criminal punishment to ensure the peacefulness 
of the society.  
Theoretically, the capacity of an organization to 
be liable before the law linked to legal 
personality. There are at least three legal 
personality theories that serve as the basis for 
granting the status of independent legal subject 
to an organization, namely, formalist, aggregate, 
and realist. Although legal personality is an 
important ground in the ability of an 
organization to incur liability in some legal 
regimes, criminal law in its development begins 
to eliminate the dichotomy between 
organizations with legal personality and 
organizations without legal personality. It can 
be said that criminal law in recognizing the 
existence of an organization depend not on its 
legal formal prerequisite, but based on the 
factual existence and participation of that 
organization in the society. This concept is 
closely related to realist legal personality theory.  
The latest Indonesian drafted penal code affirms 
that person is human and corporation. 
Corporation is defined with broad meaning as 
organized group of persons and/or property, 
either has legal personality or no legal 
personality. From this definition can be said that 
there are some sense of aggregate corporate 
personality theory. Corporations are 
undoubtedly the most noticeable organizations 
that are treated as legal persons. Corporation 
obtain its legal personality through the process 
of incorporation. Therefore, it is inappropriate to 
adopt corporation terminology to include 
entities without legal personality in its realm. 
Broad definition that is adopted by drafted 
penal code creates confusion about the theory of 
legal personhood, since it also accommodates 
organizations without legal personality into the 
meaning of corporations.  
Criminal law in fact, does not question the 
dichotomy between entities with legal 
personality and without legal personality and 
treats them equally as both liable and 
punishable agent. Therefore, I argue that the 
most convenient terminology to refer to 
collective actor in criminal law is organization, 
instead of corporation. Thus, in constructing 
criminal liability we do not trapped in the 
concept of legal personality, but focus on the 
characteristic of its organization as independent 
subject. 
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